Consider an agent interacting with an environment in cycles. In every interaction cycle the agent is rewarded for its performance. We compare the average reward U from cycle 1 to m (average value) with the future discounted reward V from cycle k to ∞ (discounted value). We consider essentially arbitrary (non-geometric) discount sequences and arbitrary reward sequences (non-MDP environments). We show that asymptotically U for m → ∞ and V for k → ∞ are equal, provided both limits exist. Further, if the effective horizon grows linearly with k or faster, then the existence of the limit of U implies that the limit of V exists. Conversely, if the effective horizon grows linearly with k or slower, then existence of the limit of V implies that the limit of U exists.
Introduction
We consider the reinforcement learning setup [RN03, Hut05] , where an agent interacts with an environment in cycles. In cycle k, the agent outputs (acts) a k , then it makes observation o k and receives reward r k , both provided by the environment. Then the next cycle k+1 starts. For simplicity we assume that agent and environment are deterministic.
Typically one is interested in action sequences, called plans or policies, for agents that result in high reward. The simplest reasonable measure of performance is the total reward sum or equivalently the average reward, called average value U 1m := 1 m [r 1 +...+r m ], where m should be the lifespan of the agent. One problem is that the lifetime is often not known in advance, e.g. often the time one is willing to let a system run depends on its displayed performance. More serious is that the measure is indifferent to whether an agent receives high rewards early or late if the values are the same.
A natural (non-arbitrary) choice for m is to consider the limit m → ∞. While the indifference may be acceptable for finite m, it can be catastrophic for m = ∞. Consider an agent that receives no reward until its first action is b k = b, and then once receives reward k−1 k . For finite m, the optimal k to switch from action a to b is k opt = m. Hence k opt → ∞ for m→ ∞, so the reward maximizing agent for m→ ∞ actually always acts with a, and hence has zero reward, although a value arbitrarily close to 1 would be achievable. (Immortal agents are lazy [Hut05, Sec.5.7] ). More serious, in general the limit U 1∞ may not even exist.
Another approach is to consider a moving horizon. In cycle k, the agent tries to maximize U km := 1 m−k+1
[r k +...+r m ], where m increases with k, e.g. m=k+h−1 with h being the horizon. This naive truncation is often used in games like chess (plus a heuristic reward in cycle m) to get a reasonably small search tree. While this can work in practice, it can lead to inconsistent optimal strategies, i.e. to agents that change their mind. Consider the example above with h = 2. In every cycle k it is better first to act a and then b (U km = r k +r k+1 = 0+ k k+1
), rather than immediately b (U km = r k +r k+1 = k−1 k +0), or a,a (U km = 0+0). But entering the next cycle k+1, the agent throws its original plan overboard, to now choose a in favor of b, followed by b. This pattern repeats, resulting in no reward at all.
The standard solution to the above problems is to consider geometrically=exponentially discounted reward [Sam37, BT96, SB98] . One discounts the reward for every cycle of delay by a factor γ <1, i.e. considers V kγ :=(1−γ) ∞ i=k γ i−k r i . The V 1γ maximizing policy is consistent in the sense that its actions a k ,a k+1 ,... coincide with the optimal policy based on V kγ . At first glance, there seems to be no arbitrary lifetime m or horizon h, but this is an illusion. V kγ is dominated by contributions from rewards r k ...r k+O(lnγ −1 ) , so has an effective horizon h eff ≈ lnγ −1 . While such a sliding effective horizon does not cause inconsistent policies, it can nevertheless lead to suboptimal behavior. For every (effective) horizon, there is a task that needs a larger horizon to be solved. For instance, while h eff =5 is sufficient for tic-tac-toe, it is definitely insufficient for chess. There are elegant closed form solutions for Bandit problems, which show that for any γ < 1, the Bayes-optimal policy can get stuck with a suboptimal arm (is not self-optimizing) [BF85, KV86] . For γ → 1, h eff → ∞, and the defect decreases. There are various deep papers considering the limit γ → 1 [Kel81] , and comparing it to the limit m → ∞ [Kak01] . The analysis is typically restricted to ergodic MDPs for which the limits lim γ→1 V 1γ and lim m→∞ U 1m exist. But like the limit policy for m→∞, the limit policy for γ →1 can display very poor performance, i.e. we need to choose γ <1 fixed in advance (but how?), or consider higher order terms [Mah96, AA99] . We also cannot consistently adapt γ with k. Finally, the value limits may not exist beyond ergodic MDPs.
There is little work on other than geometric discounts. In the psychology and economics literature it has been argued that people discount a one day=cycle delay in reward more if it concerns rewards now rather than later, e.g. in a year (plus one day) [FLO02] . So there is some work on "sliding" discount sequences W kγ ∝ γ 0 r k +γ 1 r k+1 +.... One can show that this also leads to inconsistent policies if γ is non-geometric [Str56, VW04] .
Is there any non-geometric discount leading to consistent policies? In [Hut02] the generally discounted value
It is well-defined for arbitrary environments, leads to consistent policies, and e.g. for quadratic discount γ k = 1/k 2 to an increasing effective horizon (proportionally to k), i.e. the optimal agent becomes increasingly farsighted in a consistent way, leads to self-optimizing policies in ergodic (kth-order) MDPs in general, Bandits in particular, and even beyond MDPs. See [Hut02] for these and [Hut05] for more results. The only other serious analysis of general discounts we are aware of is in [BF85] , but their analysis is limited to Bandits and so-called regular discount. This discount has bounded effective horizon, so also does not lead to self-optimizing policies.
The asymptotic total average performance U 1∞ and future discounted performance V ∞γ are of key interest. For instance, often we do not know the exact environment in advance but have to learn it from past experience, which is the domain of reinforcement learning [SB98] and adaptive control theory [KV86] . Ideally we would like a learning agent that performs asymptotically as well as the optimal agent that knows the environment in advance.
Contents and main results. The subject of study of this paper is the relation between U 1∞ and V ∞γ for general discount γ and arbitrary environment. The importance of the performance measures U and V , and general discount γ has been discussed above. There is also a clear need to study general environments beyond ergodic MDPs, since the real world is neither ergodic (e.g. losing an arm is irreversible) nor completely observable.
The only restriction we impose on the discount sequence γ is summability (Γ 1 < ∞) so that V kγ exists, and monotonicity (γ k ≥γ k+1 ). Our main result is that if both limits U 1∞ and V ∞γ exist, then they are necessarily equal (Section 7, Theorem 19). Somewhat surprisingly this holds for any discount sequence γ and any environment (reward sequence r), whatsoever.
Note that limit U 1∞ may exist or not, independent of whether V ∞γ exists or not. We present examples of the four possibilities in Section 2. Under certain conditions on γ, existence of U 1∞ implies existence of V ∞γ , or vice versa. We show that if (a quantity closely related to) the effective horizon grows linearly with k or faster, then existence of U 1∞ implies existence of V ∞γ and their equality (Section 5, Theorem 15). Conversely, if the effective horizon grows linearly with k or slower, then existence of V ∞γ implies existence of U 1∞ and their equality (Section 6, Theorem 17). Note that apart from discounts with oscillating effective horizons, this implies (and this is actually the path used to prove) the first mentioned main result. In Sections 3 and 4 we define and provide some basic properties of average and discounted value, respectively.
Example Discount and Reward Sequences
In order to get a better feeling for general discount sequences, effective horizons, average and discounted value, and their relation and existence, we first consider various examples.
Notation. In the following we assume that i,k,m,n ∈ IN are natural numbers, F := lim n F n = lim k→∞ inf n>k F n denotes the limit inferior and F := lim n F n = lim k→∞ sup n>k F n the limit superior of F n , ∀ ′ n means for all but finitely many n, γ = (γ 1 ,γ 2 ,...) denotes a summable discount sequence in the sense that Γ k := ∞ i=k γ i <∞ and γ k ∈ IR + ∀k, r = (r 1 ,r 2 ,...) is a bounded reward sequence w.l.g. r k ∈ [0,1] ∀k, constants α,β ∈ [0,1], boundaries 0 ≤ k 1 < m 1 < k 2 < m 2 < k 3 < ..., total average value U 1m := Γ k }. The closely related quantity h quasi k := Γ k /γ k , which we call the quasi-horizon, will play an important role in this work. The following table summarizes various discounts with their properties.
For instance, the standard discount is geometric γ k =γ k for some 0≤γ <1, with constant effective horizon
. (An agent with γ =0.95 can/will not plan farther than about 10-20 cycles ahead). Since in this work we allow for general discount, we can even recover the average value U 1m by choosing γ k = { 1 for k≤m 0 for k>m
is very interesting, since it leads to a linearly increasing effective horizon h eff k ∝ k, i.e. to an agent whose farsightedness increases proportionally with age. This choice has some appeal, as it avoids preselection of a global time-scale like m or 1 1−γ , and it seems that humans of age k years usually do not plan their lives for more than, perhaps, the next k years. It is also the boundary case for which U 1∞ exists if and only if V ∞γ exists.
Example reward sequences. Most of our (counter)examples will be for binary reward r ∈ {0,1}
∞ . We call a maximal consecutive subsequence of ones a 1-run. We denote start, end, and length of the nth run by k n , m n −1, and A n = m n −k n , respectively. The following 0-run starts at m n , ends at k n+1 −1, and has length B n = k n+1 −m n . The (non-normalized) discount sum in 1/0-run n is denoted by a n / b n , respectively. The following definition and two lemmas facilitate the discussion of our examples. The proofs contain further useful relations.
Definition 1 (Value for binary rewards) Every binary reward sequence r ∈ {0,1}
∞ can be defined by the sequence of change points 0 ≤ k 1 < m 1 < k 2 < m 2 < ... with
The intuition behind the following lemma is that the relative length A n of a 1-run and the following 0-run B n (previous 0-run B n−1 ) asymptotically provides a lower (upper) limit of the average value U 1m .
Lemma 2 (Average value for binary rewards) For binary r of Definition 1, let A n := m n −k n and B n := k n+1 −m n be the lengths of the nth 1/0-run. Then
Note the equalities in the last line. The ≥ holds, since (U 1kn ) and (U 1,mn−1 ) are subsequences of (U 1m ). Now
This implies inf n An An+Bn ≤ inf n U 1,kn−1 . If the condition in (2) is initially (for a finite number of n) violated, the conclusion in (2) still holds asymptotically. A standard argument along these lines shows that we can replace the inf by a lim, i.e. Similarly to Lemma 2, the asymptotic ratio of the discounted value a n of a 1-run and the discount sum b n of the following (b n−1 of the previous) 0-run determines the upper (lower) limits of the discounted value V kγ . Lemma 3 (Discounted value for binary rewards) For binary r of Definition 1, let a n := mn−1
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 2. The elementary identity
Note the equalities in the last line. The ≥ holds, since (V knγ ) and (V mnγ ) are subsequences of (V kγ ). Now if an an+bn ≥ β ∀n ≥ n 0 then V knγ = an + a n+1 + ... an+bn+a n+1 +b n+1 +...
≥ β
Example 4 (U 1∞ = V ∞γ ) Constant rewards r k ≡ α is a trivial example for which U 1∞ = V ∞γ = α exist and are equal.
A more interesting example is r =1 1 0 2 1 3 0 4 ... of linearly increasing 0/1-run-length with A n = 2n−1 and B n = 2n, for which 
Example 6 (U 1∞ ⇒ V ∞γ ) Let us reconsider the more interesting example r = 1 1 0 2 1 3 0 4 ... of linearly increasing 0/1-run-length with A n = 2n−1 and B n = 2n for which U 1∞ = 1 2 exists, as expected. On the other hand, for geometric discount γ k =γ k , using Γ k = γ k 1−γ and a n = Γ kn −Γ mn =
bn an ∼γ An →0 and a n+1 bn ∼γ Bn →0, we get V ∞γ =α=0<1=β =V ∞γ . Again, this is plausible since for k at the beginning of a long run, V kγ is dominated by the reward 0/1 in this run, due to the bounded effective horizon of geometric γ. , which implies a n = Γ kn −Γ mn ∼[4n
exists.
Example 8 (Non-monotone discount γ, U 1∞ = V ∞γ ) Monotonicity of γ in Theorems 15, 17, and 19 is necessary. As a simple counter-example consider alternating rewards r 2k = 0 with arbitrary γ 2k and r 2k−1 = 1 with γ 2k−1 = 0, which implies V kγ ≡ 0, but U 1∞ = , and replacing the sums in the definitions of a n and b n by integrals, we get a n ∼ . For instance choose γ k ∝ γ k geometric until
> n, then repeat with n; n+1. The proportionality constants can be chosen to insure monotonicity of γ. For such γ neither Theorem 15 nor Theorem 17 is applicable, only Theorem 19.
Average Value
We now take a closer look at the (total) average value U 1m and relate it to the future average value U km , an intermediate quantity we need later. We recall the definition of the average value:
Definition 10 (Average value, U 1m ) Let r i ∈ [0,1] be the reward at time i ∈ IN. Then
is the average value from time 1 to m, and U 1∞ := lim m→∞ U 1m the average value if it exists.
We also need the average value U km := 1 m−k+1 m i=k r i from k to m and the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 (Convergence of future average value, U k∞ ) For k m ≤ m → ∞ and every k we have
The first equivalence states the obvious fact (and problem) that any finite initial part has no influence on the average value U 1∞ . Chunking together many U kmm implies the last ⇐. The ⇒ only works if we average in U kmm over sufficiently many rewards, which the stated condition ensures (r = 101010... and k m = m is a simple counter-example). Note that
by (5), but U 1∞ does not exist).
Proof. The trivial identity mU
⇔) The numerator is bounded by 1, and for fixed k and m→∞ the denominator tends to ∞, which proves ⇔. ⇒) We choose (small) ε > 0, m ε large enough so that |U 1m −α| < ε ∀m≥m ε , and m ≥ , and l so that k m l ≤ m ε ≤ m l . Then
This shows that |U 1m −α| ≤ 2ε for sufficiently large m, hence U 1m → α.
Discounted Value
We now take a closer look at the (future) discounted value V kγ for general discounts γ, and prove some useful elementary asymptotic properties of discount γ k and normalizer Γ k . We recall the definition of the discounted value:
Definition 12 (Discounted value, V kγ ) Let r i ∈ [0,1] be the reward and γ i ≥ 0 a discount at time i ∈ IN, where γ is assumed to be summable in the sense that
is the γ-discounted future value and V ∞γ := lim k→∞ V kγ its limit if it exists.
We say that γ is monotone if γ k+1 ≤ γ k ∀k. Note that monotonicity and Γ k > 0 ∀k implies γ k > 0 ∀k and convexity of Γ k .
Lemma 13 (Discount properties, γ/Γ)
Furthermore, (i) implies (ii), but not necessarily the other way around (even not if γ is monotone).
(ii) The first equivalence follows from Γ k = γ k + Γ k+1 . The proof for the second equivalence is the same as for (i) with γ replaced by Γ.
→1 for k =2 n .
Average Implies Discounted Value
We now show that existence of lim m U 1m can imply existence of lim k V kγ and their equality. The necessary and sufficient condition for this implication to hold is roughly that the effective horizon grows linearly with k or faster. The auxiliary quantity U km is in a sense closer to V kγ than U 1m is, since the former two both average from k (approximately) to some (effective) horizon. If γ is sufficiently smooth, we can chop the area under the graph of V kγ (as a function of k) "vertically" approximately into a sum of average values, which implies Proposition 14 (Future average implies discounted value, U ∞ ⇒ V ∞γ ) Assume k ≤ m k → ∞ and monotone γ with
The proof idea is as follows: Let k 1 = k and k n+1 = m kn +1. Then for large k we get
The (omitted) formal proof specifies the approximation error, which vanishes for k → ∞.
Actually we are more interested in relating the (total) average value U 1∞ to the (future) discounted value V kγ . The following (first main) Theorem shows that for linearly or faster increasing quasi-horizon, we have V ∞γ = U 1∞ , provided the latter exists.
Theorem 15 (Average implies discounted value,
For instance, quadratic, power and harmonic discounts satisfy the condition, but faster-than-power discount like geometric do not. Note that Theorem 15 does not imply Proposition 14.
The intuition of Theorem 15 for binary reward is as follows: For U 1m being able to converge, the length of a run must be small compared to the total length m up to this run, i.e. o(m). The condition in Theorem 15 ensures that the quasi-horizon h quasi k = Ω(k) increases faster than the run-lengths o(k), hence V kγ ≈ U kΩ(k) ≈ U 1m (Lemma 11) asymptotically averages over many runs, hence should also exist. The formal proof "horizontally" slices V kγ into a weighted sum of average rewards U 1m . Then U 1m → α implies V kγ → α.
Proof. We represent V kγ as a δ j -weighted mixture of U 1j 's for j ≥ k, where δ j := γ j −γ j+1 ≥ 0. The condition ∞ > c ≥ kγ k Γ k =: c k ensures that the excessive initial part ∝ U 1,k−1 is "negligible". It is easy to show that
We choose some (small) ε > 0, and m ε large enough so that |U 1m −α| < ε ∀m ≥ m ε . Then, for k > m ε we get
Theorem 15 can, for instance, be applied to Example 4. Examples 5, 6, and 8 demonstrate that the conditions in Theorem 15 cannot be dropped. The following proposition shows more strongly, that the sufficient condition is actually necessary (modulo monotonicity of γ), i.e. cannot be weakened.
For every monotone γ with sup k kγ k Γ k = ∞, there are r for which U 1∞ exists, but not V ∞γ .
The proof idea is to construct a binary r such that all change points k n and m n satisfy Γ kn ≈ 2Γ mn . This ensures that V knγ receives a significant contribution from 1-run n, i.e. is large. Choosing k n+1 ≫ m n ensures that V mnγ is small, hence V kγ oscillates. Since the quasi-horizon h quasi k =Ω(k) is small, the 1-runs are short enough to keep U 1m small so that U 1∞ = 0.
Proof. The assumption ensures that there exists a sequence m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , ... for which
We further (can) require Γ mn < 1 2
For each m n we choose k n such that Γ kn ≈2Γ mn . More precisely, since Γ is monotone decreasing and Γ mn <2Γ mn ≤Γ m n−1 +1 , there exists (a unique) k n in the range m n−1 < k n < m n such that Γ kn+1 < 2Γ mn ≤ Γ kn . We choose a binary reward sequence with r k = 1 iff k n ≤ k < m n for some n. This implies
∀l, hence U 1∞ =0. On the other hand
This shows that V kγ cannot converge to an α < 1. Theorem 19 and U 1∞ = 0 implies that V kγ can also not converge to 1, hence V ∞γ does not exist.
Discounted Implies Average Value
We now turn to the converse direction that existence of V ∞γ can imply existence of U 1∞ and their equality, which holds under a nearly converse condition on the discount: Roughly, the effective horizon has to grow linearly with k or slower.
Theorem 17 (Discounted implies average value,
For instance, power or faster and geometric discounts satisfy the condition, but harmonic does not. Note that power discounts satisfy the conditions of Theorems 15 and 17, i.e. U 1∞ exists iff V ∞γ in this case.
The intuition behind Theorem 17 for binary reward is as follows: The run-length needs to be small compared to the quasi-horizon, i.e. o(h quasi k ), to ensure convergence of V kγ . The condition in Theorem 17 ensures that the quasi-horizon h quasi k = O(k) grows at most linearly, hence the run-length o(m) is a small fraction of the sequence up to m. This ensures that U 1m ceases to oscillate. The formal proof slices U 1m in "curves" to a weighted mixture of discounted values V kγ . Then V kγ → α implies U 1m → α.
In order for the first term on the r.h.s. to be a uniform mixture, we need
Setting i = k and, respectively, subtracting an i ; i−1 term we get
So we can evaluate the b-sum in the l.h.s. of (6) to
where we shifted the sum index in the second equality, and used Γ j −Γ j+1 = γ j in the third equality. Inserting (7) and (8) into (6) we get
Note that the excess c m over unity in (8) equals the coefficient of the tail contribution V m+1,γ . The above bound shows that
Hence U m/2,m → α, which implies U 1m → α by Lemma 11.
Theorem 17 can, for instance, be applied to Example 4. Examples 7 and 8 demonstrate that the conditions in Theorem 17 cannot be dropped. The following proposition shows more strongly, that the sufficient condition is actually necessary, i.e. cannot be weakened.
For every monotone γ with sup k Γ k kγ k = ∞, there are r for which V ∞γ exists, but not U 1∞ .
Proof. The assumption ensures that there exists a sequence k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , ... for which
We choose a binary reward sequence with r k = 1 iff k n ≤ k < m n := 2k n .
which implies V ∞γ = 0 by (4). In a sense the 1-runs become asymptotically very sparse. On the other hand,
, hence U 1∞ does not exist.
Average Equals Discounted Value
Theorem 15 and 17 together imply for nearly all discount types (all in our table) that U 1∞ = V ∞γ if U 1∞ and V ∞γ both exist. But Example 9 shows that there are γ for which simultaneously sup k Γ k kγ k = ∞ and sup k kγ k Γ k = ∞, i.e. neither Theorem 15, nor Theorem 17 applies. This happens for quasi-horizons that grow alternatingly super-and sub-linear. Luckily, it is easy to also cover this missing case, and we get the remarkable result that U 1∞ equals V ∞γ if both exist, for any monotone discount sequence γ and any reward sequence r, whatsoever.
Theorem 19 (Average equals discounted value, U 1∞ = V ∞γ )
Assume monotone γ and that U 1∞ and V ∞γ exist. Then U 1∞ = V ∞γ .
Proof. Case 1, sup k Γ k kγ k < ∞: By assumption, there exists an α such that V kγ → α. Theorem 17 now implies U 1m → α, hence U 1∞ = V ∞γ = α.
Case 2, sup k
This implies that there is an infinite subsequence k 1 < k 2 < k 3 ,... for which Γ k i /k i γ k i → ∞, i.e. c k i := k i γ k i /Γ k i ≤ c < ∞. By assumption, there exists an α such that U 1m → α. If we look at the proof of Theorem 15, we see that it still implies |V k i γ −α| < (1+c k i )ε ≤ (1+2c)ε on this subsequence. Hence V k i γ → α. Since we assumed existence of the limit V kγ this shows that the limit necessarily equals α, i.e. again U 1∞ = V ∞γ = α.
Considering the simplicity of the statement in Theorem 19, the proof based on the proofs of Theorems 15 and 17 is remarkably complex. A simpler proof, if it exists, probably avoids the separation of the two (discount) cases.
Example 8 shows that the monotonicity condition in Theorem 19 cannot be dropped.
Discussion
We showed that asymptotically, discounted and average value are the same, provided both exist. This holds for essentially arbitrary discount sequences (interesting since geometric discount leads to agents with bounded horizon) and arbitrary reward sequences (important since reality is neither ergodic nor MDP). Further, we exhibited the key role of power discounting with linearly increasing effective horizon. First, it separates the cases where existence of U 1∞ implies/is-implied-by existence of V ∞γ . Second, it neither requires nor introduces any artificial time-scale; it results in an increasingly farsighted agent with horizon proportional to its own age. In particular, we advocate the use of quadratic discounting γ k = 1/k 2 . All our proofs provide convergence rates, which could be extracted from them. For simplicity we only stated the asymptotic results. The main theorems can also be generalized to probabilistic environments. Monotonicity of γ and boundedness of rewards can possibly be somewhat relaxed. A formal relation between effective horizon and the introduced quasi-horizon may be interesting.
